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Factions have dominated Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since its 
inception in 1995.  During these postwar years, factions have been portrayed as 
institutionalized structures used for the distribution of party positions, cabinet 
appointments, and campaign funds.  However, little is known about the influence of 
factions after the LDP’s 1993 split and Japan’s 1994 electoral reforms.  Both scholars and 
the public believed these two colossal events would eliminate the LDP’s need for 
factions.  Nevertheless, factions continue to flourish in the LDP and significantly impact 
Japanese politics.  This paper will provide an update on the recent activities of the LDP’s 
factions and their impact in areas such as cabinet appointments.  Ultimately, I will argue 
that factions have become institutionalized in the LDP through a combination of 
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A Note on Japanese Names 
 
Traditionally, Japanese names are written with the surname first and the given name 
second.  For example, in the name Tanaka Kakuei, Tanaka is the surname and Kakuei is 





From the 1955 until 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated 
Japanese politics by maintaining a majority in both houses of the legislature or Diet.  
Intra-party factions, habatsu, became an integral part of the LDP during these postwar 
years.  Factions have been portrayed as institutionalized structures used for the 
distribution of party positions, cabinet appointments, and campaign funds (Curtis 1988, 
Fukui 1970, Neary 2002, Richardson 1999).  However, the research on factions 
concludes before two major developments in the LDP and Japanese politics: (1) In 1993, 
the LDP split in two after a significant number of Diet members renounced their LDP 
membership and formed a separate party.  (2) In 1994, the Diet passed a package of 
reforms redesigning the election process for the House of Representatives. 
These two developments have produced several questions worthy of further 
investigation.  How have factions faired since 1993?  Have factions’ primary functions, 
appointments and campaign funding, remained the same?  Which factors or combinations 
of factors – party size, electoral processes, personal ties, ideology, or other factors – 
continue to contribute to the existence of factions? 
To answer these questions I propose to survey factional and faction member 
behavior from 1993 until 2000.  This task will involve investigating changes in Japanese 
politics, updating the postwar faction lineages, and examining the role of factions in 
cabinet and party appointments.  I intend to argue that neither key changes in Japanese 
politics nor the LDP leadership’s various attempts to end factions have been successful in 
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reducing factions’ influence.  Factions continue to flourish in the LDP and have become a 
seemingly inevitable part of the system. 
In the remainder of Chapter 1, I will provide a more complete definition of the 
term “faction” and a historical overview of factions from 1955 until 1993.  In Chapter 2, I 
will discuss major changes in Japanese politics that had the potential to change factional 
behavior.  In Chapter 3, I will provide an update on factions’ lineages, activities, and 
reactions to the issues presented in Chapter 2.  In Chapter 4, I will examine recent party 
and cabinet appointments to look for evidence of factions’ influence.  I will conclude in 
Chapter 5 by summarizing my findings and speculating on reasons for the continued 
significance of factions throughout the 1990s. 
 
Factional Motivations 
Why should an LDP politician join a faction?  What specific benefits are there for 
faction members and their leaders?  What are the ultimate goals of factions?  These are 
all questions that must be addressed before surveying factions’ past and present activities. 
Scholars agree that there are two primary reasons a LDP politician will join a 
faction (Curtis 1988, Fukui 1970).  The first of these reasons is funding.  Running a 
political campaign in any country is an expensive proposition.  In Japan, factions provide 
a reliable stream of financial support to offset campaign costs.  The second motivation for 
an LDP member has to join a faction involves power.  During the postwar era factions 
have been the driving force behind most party and cabinet appointments.  Whenever 
party or cabinet positions need to be filled, faction leaders submit lists with potential 
prospects from their faction.  The party president/prime minister selects names from these 
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lists to fill his vacant positions, typically in order of seniority.  Once faction members 
have had a successful run in the Diet (usually at least four terms), there is a legitimate 
chance their name will appear on one of these lists.  Granted, a faction member must also 
be in good standing with the faction head.  
In exchange for campaign funds, party appointments, and cabinet positions each 
faction member is expected to devote his or her political loyalties to their respective 
faction leader. A faction head with a strong support base is more likely to gain high-
ranking appointments for himself and his members.  Historically, the heads of the largest 
factions (Sato, Tanaka, Takeshita, etc.) have had the most success in securing these 
positions.  This is known as a patron-client relationship or oyban-kobun with the patron 
as the faction leader and the client consisting of his core group of supporters (Curtis 
1989:81). 
During the years of multi-member electoral districts it became not only 
advantageous, but also necessary for the LDP to run multiple candidates in each electoral 
district in order for the party to obtain a majority in the Diet.   New politicians often 
sought the support of a faction that did not yet have a candidate in his district with hopes 
of obtaining funds and the necessary political backing to succeed in a Diet campaign 




The remaining portion of this chapter will be devoted to providing a historical 
overview of factions from 1955 until 1993.  This overview is broken into three 
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“generations” of factional activity.  The first generation includes the role of factions in 
the LDP’s inception and various developments during the 1960s.  The second generation 
focuses on Tanaka Kakuei and his effects on the structure and purpose of factions.  The 
third and final generation covers factional activities in the post-Tanaka years up until the 
LDP’s 1993 split.  I realize the history of the LDP and its factions may seem 
overwhelming at times, so I have included Ian Neary’s superb flow chart of factional 
lineages (see figure 1.1). 
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Factions have existed in the LDP since its creation via the merger of the Liberal 
Party and the Democratic Party in 1955.  These original factions were formed from 
groupings of politicians from the LDP’s two parent parties. Yoshida Shigeru, Ogata 
Taketora, and Ono Bamboku led the factions of former Liberal Party members.  Kishi 
Nobusuka, Miki Bukichi, and Hatoyama Ichiro led the factions of former Democratic 
Party members.  These men succeeded in solidifying their factional bases by holding 
monthly meetings during the LDP’s first year in existence (Fukui 1970: 108).  In 
addition, faction leaders Hatoyama, Miki, Ogata, and Ono were selected as acting party 
presidents and became the LDP’s first presidential selection committee.  This set the 
prescient for faction leaders securing positions of party authority. 
These early factions did not remain in their original state for long.  Faction heads 
Ogata and Miki passed away in 1956, and control of their factions was transferred to Ishii 
Mitsujiro and Kono Ichiro.  These leadership transitions occurred without major intra-
faction conflict, but other factions did not fair as well.  For example, the Yoshida faction 
split into two new factions headed by Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisauku after intense intra-
faction fighting.  This split marks the first major factional division in the LDP. 
By the end of the 1950s, the factional map included groups headed by Ikeda, 
Ishibashi Tanzan, Ishii, Kishi, Kono, Matsumura Kenzo, Mitsujiro, Ono, and Sato.  These 
factions formed “loose opposing alliances” consisting of “dominant” and “dissident” 
coalitions (Fukui 1970:108).  The larger, or dominant coalition, supported the party’s 
incumbent president, while the smaller, or dissident coalition, opposed the incumbent.  
Fukui has successfully tracked the development of dominant and dissident coalitions 
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from the mid-1950s until 1967 (see figure 1.2).  These alliances between factions are 
prime examples of factions functioning as smaller political parties within the LDP. 
 
Figure 1.2. Fukui’s Categorization of Factions in the LDP, 1955-67 
 
 
Source: Fukui 1970:109. 
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The coalitions of dominate and dissident factions continued throughout the 1960s.  
However, multiple divisions significantly increased the number of players on the LDP 
factional map.  Intra-faction fighting split the Kishi faction into three new factions under 
Fujiyama Aiichiro, Fukuda Takeo, and Kawashima Shojiro.  Kono also dealt with intra-
faction fighting in his faction, but it remained intact until his death.  The remnants of 
Kono’s faction reorganized into two new factions under Nakasone Yasuhiro and Mori 
Kiyoshi.  In addition, Ono’s death led to the split of his faction into two groups led by 
Funada Naka and Murakami Isamu. 
The Ikeda and Sato factions were the most successful in obtaining leadership 
positions during this decade.  Unlike the other factions, the Ikeda and Sato groups 
avoided divisions that reduced the number of their members.  Ikeda did pass away, but a 
smooth leadership transition to Maeo Shigesaburo prevented a split or any serious intra-
faction conflict.  Sato’s political success allowed him to expand the size of his faction to 
over 100 members.  This gave him the support base necessary to become Prime Minister 
and head of the “dominant” coalition of factions. (Fukui: 1970:112). 
 
Second Generation 
The second generation of factions in the LDP is dominated by the actions of 
Sato’s successor, Tanaka Kakuei.  Tanaka gained the loyalty of Sato’s faction by 
portraying himself as a younger politician with a stronger future than the aging Sato.  
Tanaka’s promises of money and power ultimately proved to be too tempting for Sato 
faction members to pass up (Neary 2002: 70).  Tanaka’s relatively quick success in the 
Felter 14 
LDP was not duplicated during his tenure as prime minister.  Issues including rising oil 
prices and faction leaders disgruntled with his quick rise to the top made him an intensely 
controversial figure within the party.  His faction members were extremely loyal, but 
others considered his impulsive style a threat to Japanese democracy.  This intra-party 
conflict escalated after the resignations of the party vice president and finance minister.  
Rumors of a party split began to spread and a right-wing policy group called Seirankai 
suggested the formation of a new party.  The controversy concluded when “a prominent 
magazine article implied [Tanaka] had used public office to become rich” (Richardson 
1999: 77). 
Miki Takeo was selected to follow Tanaka as Prime Minister because his “clean” 
political record distanced him from Tanaka and the other politicians tainted by the 
Lockheed Scandal.  Miki’s term, however, was defined by Tanaka’s arrest and intra-party 
rebellion.  In protest of the LDP’s association with corruption and the Lockheed Scandal, 
a group of young LDP members split off from the party and formed the New Liberal 
Club (NLC).  While the NLC dissolved and rejoined the LDP in 1986, its existence did 
inspire talks of the formation of a new centrist party. 
Miki only served one term as prime minister because he was forced to take the 
fall for the LDP’s poor showing the in 1976 election.  The LDP received a bare majority 
of votes, and rumors of the party’s demise were beginning to spread.  His replacement, 
Fukuda Takeo, served two years, but became a victim of his own confidence after trying 
to bypass the LDP presidential electoral system.  Under Miki, the LDP adopted a new 
election method for elections where three or more candidates were running for president.  
This system included a primary vote open to all party members and a runoff vote open to 
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Diet members.  Fukuda claimed the winner of the primary election was entitled to the 
office because a second election “risked unnecessary conflict” (Neary 2002:71).  At the 
time of this assertion Fukuda was unaware Tanaka had rallied his loyal support base 
around LDP Secretary General Ohira (of the Maeo, formally Ikeda, faction).  Ohira won 
the primary election in a landslide. 
Fukuda resigned as party president to make way for Ohira, but the LDP’s 
confidence in Ohira was rattled after he showed interest in introducing a new sales tax.  
Ohira’s comments threw the LDP into turmoil and the party nominated both Fukuda and 
Ohira for Prime Minister.  Tanaka again came to Ohira’s aid, but a no-confidence motion 
and heart attack forced Ohira to turn control of the Prime Minister’s office to Suzuki 
Zenko in 1980. 
During these events Tanaka continued to lurk in the background.  He disbanded 
his faction in 1977, and set up “informal support groups.”  These support groups 
eventually merged into a reincarnated Tanaka faction, which had expanded to 118 
members by the early 1980s.  This success revived Tanaka’s hopes of recapturing the 
prime minister position (Weir 1999:59). Tanaka’s faction had amassed an unusually large 
number of members during his tenure as party president, but the fact that politicians still 
flocked to him after his legal woes was unprecedented. 
Ono Bamboku, an early faction leader, claimed forty members was the ideal 
number for balancing faction memberships with appointments and available funding 
(Curtis 1988:82).  Politicians had clearly become more interested in rising to the top as 
quickly as possible and Tanaka was the mastermind behind such things.  Tanaka’s 
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attempt to create a large faction forced other factions to resort to the same tactics.  This 
resulted in the dissolution of several smaller factions like Mori and Kawashima. 
 
Third Generation 
The third generation of factions is defined by Tanaka’s decline and widespread 
scandals.  Tanaka’s influence began to dissipate during Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro’s first term.  Tanaka recovered from a stroke in time to run against Nakasone in 
1986, but Tanaka’s time as the as the party’s official leader had come to a close.  Control 
of the 113 member faction was transferred to Takeshita Noboru, but Tanaka continued to 
influence the party in an unofficial capacity.  Takeshita secured the presidency in 1987 
after defeating Abe Shintaro, head of the former Fukuda faction, and Miyazawa Kiichi, 
head of the former Suzuki faction (Neary 2002: 74). 
Scandals have been a part of Japanese politics for a number of years, but in 1989 
both Takeshita and Nakasone were implicated in the Recruit Scandal.  A number of LDP 
members were accused of accepting unlisted stocks from a recruitment company, which 
could be sold for profit at a later date.  While factions are typically eager to get their 
hands on the party presidency, nearly every likely candidate – including Hosokawa, 
Takeshita, Abe, and Miyazawa – were tainted by this scandal.  Uno Sosuke, Takeshita’s 
foreign minister, served as Prime Minister for two months, but he was forced to resign 
when his affair with a geisha became pubic knowledge (Neary 2002: 75). 
During the Lockheed scandal, the LDP turned to Miki Takeo because the party 
needed a Prime Minister with a “clean” political record.  The Recruit Scandal forced the 
LDP to turn to another “clean” politician from the former Miki faction, Kaifu Toshiki.  
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While Kaifu’s unblemished political record may have been desirable, his weak leadership 
credentials quickly dissolved his small LDP support base. 
 
Conclusion 
Factions have been an integral part of the Liberal Democratic Party since its 
inception in 1955.  The party’s original factions were formed from groups within the 
Liberal and Democratic parties.  These factions still follow longstanding practices and 
have outlasted internal conflicts, divisions, scandals, and deaths of key members.  This is 
why scholars have successfully established factions as institutionalized coalitions in the 
postwar era.  However, it is important to remember that factions also have a history of 
revealing the LDP’s fragility.  Factions may follow longstanding practices, but the 





I will spend this chapter highlighting a series of major changes in Japanese 
politics from 1993 until 2000.  These issues all have the potential to transform factional 
influence and behavior.  There is a reasonable amount of overlap on these issues.  
Scandals like Recruit and Sagawa Kyubin gave opposition parties the ammunition they 
needed to oust the LDP from power in 1993.  This coalition government initialed 
electoral and financial reforms that were supposed to reform Japan’s political climate and 
eliminate the need for factions.  Finally, the LDP has had to form coalitions of its own 
since its return to power in 1994. 
 
Scandals and Corruption 
Japanese politicians often wear white gloves as they campaign to present a 
“clean” image, but the reality is that large numbers of elected officials have been 
associated with scandals during their careers.  While the public appears to be 
continuously frustrated with this fact, politicians need not worry – with enough factional 
pressure, even convicted felons may be appointed to cabinet posts (see Chapter 4). 
A number of LDP members and faction leaders were tainted by the Recruit 
Scandal, but none of these people were ever convicted.  However, the LDP was hit with 
another major scandal in the early 1990s.  The President of Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin, a 
parcel-delivery service company, served as a “go-between for conservative party 
politicians and mobsters by manipulating a massive sum of money from the coffers of his 
own company for illegal donations” (Japan Economic Almanac 1993 1993: 13).  In 
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addition, Kanemaru Shin of the Takeshita faction used Tokyo Sagawa’s yakuza (mob) 
connections to protect Takeshita Noboru during his campaign for Prime Minister in 1987. 
The thought that the yakuza had penetrated Japan’s most powerful political party 
left many citizens questioning their beliefs in the LDP and their government as a whole.  
The failure of Prime Minister Miyazawa to control the situation made matters worse.  
Miyazawa’s reputation had been tarnished earlier in the year when one of his primary 
supporters, Abe Shintaro, was arrested for accepting 80 million in bribes from the Kyowa 
Corporation (Japan Economic Almanac 1993: 20).  These instances proved Miyazawa’s 
promises of drastic reforms were the same empty promises made by the Prime Ministers 
before him. 
  
The LDP’s Split and Coalition Governments 
1993 is clearly a watershed year in Japanese politics.  After 38 years of political 
domination, the LDP was expelled from power by a massive eight party coalition.  The 
Social Democratic Party of Japan, Komeito, Democratic Socialist, United Socialist, 
Sakigake, Shinseito, Japan New Party, and Democratic Reform Party formed united 
under a platform that emphasized “altering the lower house’s multi-seat system to one 
that combines single seat districts and proportional representation” (Nikkei Weekly 
8/2/93).  The LDP faced its first major test as an opposition party when the coalition 
government formed under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa worked to pass reforms 
emphasizing proportional representation (see Electoral Reform below). 
Hosokawa’s resignation in April 1994 gave the LDP an opportunity to return to 
power with one of the arguably most unexpected coalition partners – the Social 
Democratic Party.  The LDP decided to unite with its old foe during a brief two month 
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government under former Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata of the conservative group 
Shinseito.  The coalition came to power under Tomiichi Murayama, the first socialist 
Prime Minister in 47 years.  LDP President Kono Yohei served as vice minister, so the 
party was not out of the picture.  The tripartite coalition of the LDP, SDP, and Sakigake 
survived until the SDP decided to disband after “having recognized that a commitment to 
socialist dogma was hardly likely to bring success to the polls given the political winds of 
the post-Cold War era” (Japan Economic Almanac 1996 1996:14). 
As the LDP recovered in the latter half of the 1990s it became less dependent on 
coalition partners and worked with the Liberal Party, a “like-minded ally,” in exchange 
for a single cabinet post (Japanese Economic Almanac 1999 1999:63). 
 
Electoral Reform 
On January 29, 1994, the Diet successfully passed historic reforms consisting of 
four related bills that required the “implementation of stricter rules concerning political 
funds, introduction of tax-funded campaign subsidies for political parties, implementation 
of a system of single seat constituencies and proportional representation, and 
establishment of a government panel to redraw constituency boundaries according to the 
new system” (Japan Economic Almanac 1995: 24).  The idea of political reform had been 
an issue LDP leaders had promised to take on since the end of the Cold War, but these 
politicians were more likely interested in portraying a reformist image than initiating 
actual reforms.  Many LDP politicians avoided electoral reform because they felt that 
Japan’s multi-seat electoral districts, antiquated as they may be, were the safest way for 
factions to retain their power (Nikkei Weekly 2/14/94). 
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Under the new system, seats in the lower house were reduced from 511 to 500.  
Of these 500 seats, 300 seats would be determined by elections in single-seat districts and 
the remaining 200 seats would be allocated through representation.  This result was a 
victory for the LDP because the coalition government had hoped for a 50-50 split of seats 
by single-seat districts and proportional representation.  Voters cast one ballot for an 
individual candidate in their single-seat district and a second ballot for a political party 
used to determine their party’s level of proportional representation.  The candidate with 
the highest number of votes in a single-seat district is elected in a first past the post 
fashion, but candidates are permitted to run in his single-seat district and place his name 
on their party’s list of candidates for proportional representation.  Therefore, it is possible 
for a candidate to lose in their district, but win a seat under the seats allocated to their 





The words faction and money politics have gone hand in hand since the LDP’s 
inception in 1955.  One young Diet member said it best:  
 
“I just go and get the money.  Policy has nothing to do with it.  I go and tell them 
that I need funds and just get them.  Just as much as I need… it takes lots of 
money to make friends, you know.” (Fukui 1970:132) 
 
This statement perfectly illustrates the role of money politics in early factions.  After the 
Lockheed Scandal, Prime Minister Miki Takeo created a series of reforms limiting the 
amount of donations a politician could receive.  A weakened version of these reforms 
eventually passed in the Diet. 
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The Recruit and Sagawa Kyubin scandals were enough to discourage many 
businesses and donors from continuing to financially support the party  and its factions in 
the early 1990s (Nikkei Weekly 6/20/94).  The LDP’s fall from power in 1993 also 
contributed to this trend.  This drop in funding made it more difficult for faction leaders 
to maintain control over their groups’ internal squabbles (many younger politicians 
blamed factions for the LDP’s loss of power), but the LDP still managed to influence the 
Hosokawa administration’s plans for financial reform (Nikkei Weekly 8/23/93).  
Originally, Hokosawa wanted to ban all private political funding and donations to 
individual politicians.  The LDP managed to convince the coalition government to pass 
reforms that only required politicians to disclose the donations they received (Nikkei 






There is little known about factions and their role in the LDP after 1993.  This 
chapter will trace the leadership transitions and activities of the LDP’s five major factions 
from 1993 until 2000.  This will show that factions continue to flourish despite electoral 
reforms, members bolting from the party, and attempts to outlaw factions altogether.  I 
have divided the chapter into sections on each faction, including flow charts of their 
lineages and multiple paragraphs on their actions throughout the 1990s. 
 
Felter 24 




























































































































The Modern Sato Faction: Obuchi, Hata, and Hashimoto 
 
Figure 3.1. Sato Faction’s Lineage 
 
Note: Times are estimated and the distances between each faction leader do not indicate the length of time 
they headed the faction. 
Sources: Fukui 1970, Neary 2002, Richardson 1999. 
 
The Sagawa Kyubin scandal effectively eliminated the modern Sato faction’s top 
level of leadership.  Prime Minister and faction head Takeshita Noboru resigned from the 
LDP after his implication in scandal.  His successor, Kanemaru Shin, was also implicated 
in the scandal a short while later.  The back-to-back resignations of these men left the 
faction without a clear choice for their next leader.  This set off an intense intra-faction 
debate between groups supporting Obuchi Keizo and Hata Tsutomu that laid the 
groundwork for the LDP’s 1993 split. 
Obuchi succeeded in taking command of the faction, but Hata and his primary 
supporter, Ozawa Ichiro, refused to fade quietly into the background.  Hata and Ichiro 
rallied the loyalties of approximately 45 faction members and bolted from the new 
Obuchi faction to form a new party called Shinseito. (Nikkei Weekly 4/26/93).  The LDP 














unprecedented.  Hata and Ozawa were the first to remove a large portion of the LDP’s 
support base and created a successful alternative party for conservative voters (Nikkei 
Weekly 12/12/94).  In a matter of months the LDP’s most powerful faction became a 
display of the LDP’s vulnerability. 
The Obuchi faction’s membership fell to third in the LDP after the split, but that 
did not stop the faction from dominating the Prime Minister’s office for nearly half of the 
1990s (Hashimoto 1996-1998 and Obuchi 1998-2000).  During these years the faction 
tended to ally itself with the Eto-Kamei faction against the Yamasaki and Kono factions.  
By 2000, the factions’ membership had returned to the highest in the LDP, but Obuchi’s 
tenure as faction head ended after falling into a coma. 
 
The Modern Kishi Faction: Mitsuzuka and Mori 
 
Figure 3.2. Kishi Faction’s Lineage 
 
Note: Times are estimated and the distances between each faction leader do not indicate the length of time 
they headed the faction. 
Sources: Fukui 1970, Neary 2002, Richardson 1999. 
 
In 1993, Mitsuzuka had high hopes that his faction could fill the void created by 
the Takeshita split.   Mitsuzuka controlled the largest faction after the split, but his 












candidate for Prime Minister (Nikkei Weekly 2/1/93).  Despite leading the LDP’s 1993 
economic recovery group, Mitsuzuka’s lack of prime minister credentials made it 
difficult for him to retain influence over his faction (Nikkei Weekly 6/20/93).  The 
faction’s membership began to decrease after younger members became frustrated with 
Mitsuzuka’s lack of leadership and the faction’s financial difficulties during the LDP’s 
opposition years (Nikkei Weekly 6/20/94). 
However, Mitsuzuka’s departure in 1999 has created a new opportunity for the 
faction.   Mori Yoshiro was selected as Prime Minister after Obuchi fell into a coma in 
2000.  Mori’s strong support for Obuchi and strong ties with the LDP’s coalition partners 
likely secured his appointment (Nikkei Weekly 4/10/00).  At this time Mori’s faction 
remains the third largest, but its future appears to be more optimistic without Mitsuzuka 
in the picture. 
 
The Modern Ikeda Faction: Miyazawa and Kato 
 
Figure 3.3. Ikeda Faction’s Lineage 
 
Note: Times are estimated and the distances between each faction leader do not indicate the length of time 
they headed the faction. 

















In the early 1990s, the Miyazawa faction was bitterly divided over electoral 
reform.  Portions of the faction wanted to implement the single seat districts, while other 
groups considered the current system more advantageous.  This caused Miyazawa, who 
was also Prime Minister, to avoid taking a stance on electoral reform until Kanemaru’s 
arrest for tax evasion (Nikkei Weekly 3/7/93).  Unfortunately, Miyazawa’s endorsement 
of single-seat districts proved to be too little, too late.  His efforts to balance the pro- and 
anti-reform groups in both his faction and his party were not unsuccessful.  In June 1993, 
the Miyazawa cabinet lost a no-confidence motion and the Takeshita faction split off 
from the LDP (Nikkei Weekly 6/7/93 and 6/21/93). 
Miyazawa may have failed to stop the party from splitting, but his faction retained 
control of the party presidency after his resignation.  Kono Yohei, a non-faction leader, 
defeated Watanabe and served the remainder of Miyazawa’s term (Nikkei Weekly 8/2/93).  
Many predicted Miyazawa’s departure would be “the end of an era” for factional politics, 
but Miyazawa actually worked to preserve factions in the LDP.  Neither of Kono’s 
pledges to dissolve factions and appoint “reform minded” candidates to party posts were 
successful (Nikkei Weekly 8/2/94).  In fact, Kono’s own faction leader, Miyazawa, 
worked with Watanabe to thwart his attempt to outlaw factions (Nikkei Weekly 10/10/94 
and 10/14/94). 
After Kono’s tenure as party president, he led his followers out of the faction to form 
a smaller, independent group centered on his views.  The Miyazawa faction continued 
under Kato Koichi.  Kato officially aligned himself with Yamasaki Taku and Koizumi 
Junichiro in an effort to give younger LDP members a stronger voice in the party.   The 
resulting “YKK Group” (Yamasaki-Kato-Koizumi) had been discussed in the press for 
Felter 29 
years, but this marked a solidification of the alliance (Nikkei Weekly 5/30/94 and 2/1/99).  
Kato ran for the LDP presidency in 1999, but his defeat resulted in isolation from Party 
President and Prime Minister Obuchi (Nikkei Weekly 9/20/93).  
 
The Modern Kono Faction: Watanabe, Eto-Kamei, and Yamasaki 
 
Figure 3.4. Kono Faction’s Lineage 
 
Note: Times are estimated and the distances between each faction leader do not indicate the length of time 
they headed the faction. 
Sources: Fukui 1970, Neary 2002, Richardson 1999. 
 
 Watanabe became the head of the modern Kono faction in 1989, but his tenure as 
faction leader was complicated by two significant problems.  Watanabe’s predecessor, 
Nakasone, had resigned after his implication in the Recruit scandal.  However, Nakasone 
remained in the faction and older members like Yamasaki Taku refused to commit their 
loyalties to Watanabe.  This intra-party division, however, was only half of Watanabe’s 
problems.  Watanabe’s history of health problems ranging from gall bladder surgery to 
“using a hospital as a hotel” forced him to resign as foreign minister (Nikkei Weekly 
2/22/93 and 3/8/93).  His health problems raised many questions about Watanabe’s future 












Watanabe’s frustrations with his intra-faction fighting, the public’s perception of 
his health, and his loss in the 1993 LDP presidential election forced him to take action.  
In 1994, Watanabe threatened to take his supporters and leave the LDP much like Ozawa 
had done a year earlier (Nikkei Weekly 4/18/94).  This caused great concern amongst the 
LDP elite.  These leaders feared Watanabe’s threat would trigger more divisions and ruin 
the party’s prestige (Nikkei Weekly 4/18/94). 
Watanabe’s threat turned out to be a bluff that severely damaged his credibility.  
As a result, he never succeeded in claiming the party presidency or controlling the intra-
faction fighting.   After Watanabe’s death, the intra-faction fighting caused the faction to 
split into Yamasaki and Eto-Kamei factions.  The Eto-Kamei faction was formed after a 
group of Watanabe supporters lead by Murakami Masakuni merged with a group led by 
former Construction Minister Kamei (Nikkei Weekly 2/1/99).  This faction worked closely 
with the Obuchi faction during the Hashimoto and Obuchi administrations.  The 
Yamasaki faction joined with groups lead by Kato Koichi and Koizumi Junichiro to form 
the “YKK Group,” a younger conservative group aligned against Kamei and Obuchi 
(Nikkei Weekly 2/1/99). 
 
The Modern Miki Faction: Komoto 
 







Note: Times are estimated and the distances between each faction leader do not indicate the length of time 
they headed the faction. 
Sources: Fukui 1970, Neary 2002, Richardson 1999. 
 
The Komoto faction provided the LDP with its two “clean” Prime Ministers, Miki 
Takeo (1974-1976) and Kaifu Toshiki (1989-1991), but its influence in the party tends to 
be minimal.   The faction typically only garners one or two appointments in an LDP 
cabinet and the positions tend to be less prestigious than those offered to the other 
factions.  In addition, the Komoto faction’s numbers appear to be on the decline. 
 
Independents 
The role of independent politicians in the LDP does not receive much coverage 
because these individuals do not have the finances or the support base to draw attention 
to their activities.  However, there have been two spikes in the number of independents 
from 1993 until 2000.  These occurred during the party’s 1993 split and the first election 
under the newly reformed system in 1996 (Nikkei Weekly 6/28/93 and Seiji Handobukku 
1996).  One would expect to see a steady increase in the number of independent LDP 
members if factions were indeed on the decline, but that is clearly not the case.  In fact, in 





As I have previously stated, there are two primary reasons LDP politicians join a 
faction: campaign funding and appointments.  In recent years the amount of funding 
available to politicians through their factional membership has decreased.  This means 
cabinet and party appointments have now become a faction member’s primary goal.  
Consequently, an examination of factions’ roles in appointments is necessary to 
determine the level of their influence in the years 1993-2000. 
LDP presidents have promised to begin appointing reform-minded candidates to 
cabinet and party positions since Kono’s election in 1994.  However, this chapter will 
show that party presidents select the vast majority of appointments based on factional 
affiliations.  Faction leaders still submit lists with potential prospects from their faction 
whenever party or cabinet positions need to be filled.  The party president/prime minister 
uses these lists to fill vacant positions based on his supporters, seniority, and the necessity 
to balance factional power within the party.   
 
Party Appointments 
The four premier posts in the LDP include party president, secretary general, 
General Council Chairman, and Policy Research Council Chairman.  
 
Party President 
The LDP President serves as the head of the party and in the majority of the postwar era 




The Secretary General’s duty is to “assist the President in the administration of 
Party affairs,” which involves running nearly “all major party operations, including 
elections, personnel, and finances” (Liberal Democratic Party Website 5/13/05). Because 
the LDP’s party president is typically running the government itself, many of the duties 
one would associate with him fall to the Secretary General.  In addition, the Secretary 
General directly oversees five executive organs and their corresponding Director 
Generals (see figure 4.1). 
 
General Council Chairman 
The General Council serves as “the party’s principle decision-making organ for 
daily affairs” and “deliberates and decides matters concerning the party’s administration, 
policies, and activities in the Diet.”  The General Council Chairman acts as the head of 
this 31 member group (Liberal Democratic Party Website 5/13/05). 
 
Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) Chairman 
The PARC Chairman oversees the complex organization consisting of “twelve 
divisions, one for each of the ministries and agencies represented in the cabinet” that 
examine “laws, budgets, taxes, [and] treaty revisions” before their submission to the Diet 





Figure 4.1. Organization of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
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The number of members of a cabinet has fluctuated slightly from 1993-2000, 
because there are three positions a prime minister may appoint at his discretion. Each 
cabinet member is the head of one the ministries that fall under the executive branch (see 
figure 4.1).  Certain cabinet positions such as finance minister or foreign minister are 
considered more prestigious and tend to be highly sought after by faction leaders.  These 
appointments are an opportunity for a prime minister to reward his supporters and 




Figure 4.2: Japanese Executive Branch 
 




During Miyazawa’s resignation speech, he announced that his successor would be 
chosen by a council of LDP members hand-selected by himself under the name “Council 
for Party Unity and Advancement.”  The group was essentially constructed to carry on 
Felter 38 
Miyazawa’s wishes and one reporter described the “council” as “reeking of faction-
centered money politics” (Nikkei Weekly 7/26/93).  When Kaijyama Seiroku, the current 
LDP Secretary-General, explained the council’s purpose to the LDP’s membership he 
was met with immediate backlash.  In an extraordinary 2.5 hour session the younger LDP 
members successfully demanded a secret ballot election instead of Miyazawa’s council.  
However, this apparent movement towards a fair and balanced system of elections was 
short lived.  Hours after Miyazawa’s resignation the five major faction leaders, 
Watanabe, Mitsuzuka, Hashimoto, Komoto, and Obuchi were sitting in a Tokyo hotel 
negotiating possible deals between the factions to secure power in the election (Nikkei 
Weekly 7/26/93). 
 
Kono Yohei Presidency and the Opposition Years 
Deputy Prime Minister Watanabe was defeated in a 208 to 159 vote by Kono 
Yohei, a Miyazawa faction member who once left the party to form the New Liberal Club 
(Nikkei Weekly 8/2/93).  Kono’s situation was unique for two reasons: (1) He was a 
member, not the head of, a faction.  (2) He became the first LDP President who did not 
automatically become Prime Minister since the LDP did not have a majority in the Diet.  
Immediately after his victory Kono proclaimed his election showed “the majority of party 
members want the LDP to change” and assured the public he would appoint “reform 





Table 4.1. Kono Yohei’s Party Appointments 
Position Appointee Faction 
Secretary-General Mori Yoshiro Mitsuzuka 
General Council Chairman Kibe Yoshiaki Watanabe 
PARC Chairman Hashimoto Ryutaro Obuchi 
   Source: Nikkei Weekly 8/2/93 
 
However, Kono ultimately proved unable to follow through on his promises of 
reform.  Each of Kono’s appointments was a prominent faction member that either lacked 
a record of electoral reform (Hashimoto) or opposed reform altogether (Mori and Kibe).  
Furthermore, Hashimoto’s appointment to the normally prestigious PARC Chairmanship 
did not give him a great degree of influence since the PARC’s role slipped during the 
LDP’s years as an opposition party. (Nikkei Weekly 8/9/93). 
The LDP’s opposition status during Kono’s tenure prevented him from appointing 
a cabinet, but that did not stop the factions from fighting for appointments under the 
Murayama administration.  Near the end of Kono’s term as president, he applied strong 
pressure to Murayama to release him from his foreign minister cabinet post, so he could 
devote more time to his reelection campaign.  This led to a cabinet reshuffle in which 
parties retained the same number of posts, but the LDP managed to pressure Murayama 
into allowing Mori, a member of the large Mitsuzuka faction, to take over the Ministry of 
Construction.  The ministry had previously been “closely guarded” by Murayama’s party 
and his willingness to give the appointment to the LDP was considered one of the many 





Hashimoto Ryutaro Presidency 
The two primary candidates in the 1995 election were incumbent president Kono 
and Ryutaro Hashimoto, Minister of International Trade and Industry.  Kono had the 
support of the Miyazawa, Mitsuzuka, and Komoto factions, which made him the favorite 
amongst Diet members.  Hashimoto was backed by the Obuchi and Watanabe factions 
and was a considerably more popular public figure (Nikkei Weekly 8/28/95).  It was 
Kono’s resignation, however, that paved the way for Hashimoto’s victory.  In his 
resignation statement Kono sited a frustration with the backdoor wheeling and dealing of 
LDP politics (Nikkei Weekly 9/4/95). Hashimoto’s eventual opponent was Koizumi 
Junichiro, a former Posts and Telecommunications Minister from the Mitsuzuka faction.  
Koizumi was not expected to win, however, there was a general consensus amongst LDP 
members that the party would be viewed as weak without a challenger to Hashimoto.  
Koizumi’s support from the Mitsuzuka faction and a handful of members from the 
Miyazawa faction was not enough to overcome Hashimoto’s broad support base among 
the remaining factions (Nikkei Weekly 9/4/95). 
 
Table 4.2. Hashimoto’s First Round of Party Appointments 
Position Appointee Faction 
Secretary-General Kato Koichi Miyazawa 
General Council Chairman Shiokawa Masajuro Mitsuzuka 
PARC Chairman Yamasaki Taku Watanabe 
  Source: Nikkei Weekly 9/4/95 
 
Hashimoto’s appointments correspond with the three largest factions in 1995 – 
Miyazawa, Mitsuzuka, and Watanabe.  Kato Koichi’s selection as Secretary-General was 
based on his early support of Hashimoto, service as PARC Chair under Kono and his 
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experience as a loyal faction member.  Yamasaki Taku is known for his knowledge of 
defense issues, a common trait of Watanabe faction members.  Shiokawa’s appointment, 
however, is more difficult to understand.  As a member of the Mitsuzuka faction, 
Shiokawa and his cohorts supported Hashimoto’s opponent Koizumi, so his appointment 
likely stemmed from an effort to balance the rivalry between the factions (Nikkei Weekly  
9/4/95). 
In a surprise move in January 1996, Murayama resigned after “being widely 
criticized as weak and ineffective.” (Nikkei Weekly 1/8/96).  Hashimoto formed “a new 
coalition government, reinstalling his LDP at the center of power for the fist time in 30 
months” (Japan Economic Almanac 1997 1997:5).  In this cabinet “posts were distributed 
amongst 12 LDP, six SDP and two Sakigake members” (Japan Economic Almanac 1997 
1997:5).  While Hashimoto succeeded in returning the LDP to the center stage of politics 
after nearly 30 months, filling cabinet positions proved unusually difficult.  The LDP’s 
coalition with the floundering SDP and Sakigake left many LDP members calling for a 
call for a general election.  Many of the party’s high ranking individuals refused to 
participate in Hashimoto’s cabinet until their request was met.  In this case, factions were 
instrumental in that they refused to participate in the cabinet.  This forced Hashimoto to 
fill the position of finance member (a normally prestigious position) with Kubo Wataru, 
one of Hashimoto’s chief critics from the SDP (Boston Globe 1/12/96). 
 
Table 4.3. Hashimoto’s Second Round of Party Appointments 
Position Appointee Faction 
Secretary-General Kato Koichi Miyazawa 
General Council Chairman Mori Yoshiro Mitsuzuka 
PARC Chairman Yamasaki Taku Watanabe 
  Source: Nikkei Weekly 11/11/96 
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Hashimoto earned a second term as LDP President in November 1996, and opted 
to retain Kato and Yamasaki in their respective positions of Secretary-General and Policy 
Research Council Chairman.  The decision to keep Kato as Secretary-General, at least in 
some part, was an effort to placate members who felt the Obuchi faction had become too 
influential.  (Both Hashimoto and Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku were 
members.)  Kato received his appointment after earning the respect of the LDP’s current 
coalition members, SDP and Sakigake.  As member of the minority Miyazawa faction, he 
also served as a balancing force.  Hashimoto’s replacement of Shiokawa with Mori 
Yoshiro was quite straightforward – Shiokawa had not won a seat in the general election 
(Nikkei Weekly 11/11/96). 
Hashimoto’s cabinet selection process operated more smoothly after his 
November re-election.  Like old times, faction leaders submitted the names of candidates 
they would like to see in cabinet positions and Hashimoto apppointed the faction 
members accordingly (Nikkei Weekly 11/11/96).  Miyazawa, the leader of the largest 
faction, was given the Finance Ministry and Muto Kabun, a former faction leader, 
became Director General of the Management and Coordination Agency (the body dealing 
with administrative reform). 
While there is evidence of some factional activity in Hashimoto’s first and second 
cabinets, it is his September 1997, re-shuffle that reminded the public of the degree of 
influence factions have on LDP appointments.  After his re-election as party president 
Hashimito kept the three primary party officials intact.  This made sense because the 
Watanabe and Miyazawa factions were known to have strong ties with the LDP’s 
coalition partners.  However, Hashimoto replaced Muto Kabun, Director General of 
Felter 43 
Management and Coordination Agency, with Sato Koko after intense pressure from 
former Prime Minister Nakasone of the Watanabe faction (Nikkei Weekly 9/15/97).  
Replacing Muto with a Watanabe faction member may have been considered weak, but 
acceptable, behavior if it were not for one detail: Sato was a convicted felon.  Sato had 
been convicted of accepting bribes in the Lockheed scandal and his appointment created 
a public relations disaster for the LDP (Nikkei Weekly 5/18/98). 
 
Obuchi Keizo Presidency 
Hashimoto resigned after the LDP’s devastating loss in the 1998 Upper House 
election.  This set up a race between Obuchi, Koizumi, and Kajiyama Seriroku, a former 
chief cabinet secretary and aggressive advocate of economic reform.  Kajiyama was a 
member of the same faction as Obuchi and Hashimoto, but traded his membership for the 
support from the Miyazawa faction.  Koizumi’s backing came from the Mitsuzuka 
faction.  Ultimately, Obuchi’s support base was too large to be overcome by Koizumi or 
Kajiyama, and he captured 225 of the 411 votes cast (Nikkei Weekly 7/27/98).  
 
Table 4.4. Obuchi’s First Round of Party Appointments 
Position Appointee Faction 
Secretary-General Mori Yoshiro Mitsuzuka 
General Council Chairman Fukaya Takashi Watanabe 
PARC Chairman Ikdea Yukihiko Kono 
  Source: Nikkei Weekly 8/3/98 
 
Obuchi claimed his first party appointments were selected on a merit-only basis. 
However, a meeting took place between Nonaka Hiromu of the Obuchi faction and Kato 
(Miyazawa faction), and Yamasaki (Watanabe faction) to “coordinate suggestions” for 
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the top party positions (Nikkei Weekly 8/3/98).  This explains the appointments of Ikea 
and Fukaya.  Mori’s faction supported Koizumi in the election, so his appointment as 
Secretary General was likely an effort to make amends with the party’s second largest 
faction. 
Aside from a few exceptions like novelist Sakaiya Taichi, Obuchi’s first cabinet 
followed the usual routine of distributing posts to faction members based on seniority.  
This cabinet included former Prime Minister Miyazawa as Finance Minister, which was 
considered an unusual, but a positive move.  However, Miyazawa’s resignation four 
months later, the split of the former Watanabe faction, and the LDP’s new alliance with 
the Liberal party led to intense intra-party squabbling by over cabinet posts by 1998’s 
end. (Nikkei Weekly 8/3/98). 
 Obuchi formed his second cabinet in January 1994, after the LDP’s alliance with 
the Liberal Party (Jiyuto) was finalized.  This cabinet essentially remained the same as 
his first, with the exception of Obuchi’s appointment of Noda Takeshi as Home Affairs 
Minister and National Public Safety Commission Chairman. 
 
Table 4.6. Obuchi’s Second Round of Party Appointments 
Position Appointee Faction 
Secretary-General Mori Yoshiro Mitsuzuka 
General Council Chairman Ikeda Yukihiko Kono 
PARC Chairman Kamei Shizuka Eto-Kamei 
  Source: Nikkei Weekly 8/3/98 
 
In October 1999, Obuchi formed his third cabinet “under a three way coalition 
joining his Liberal Democratic Party to the Liberal Party and New Komeito” (Japan 
Economic Almanac 2000 2000:153).  Obuchi’s appointments reflected a desire to 
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distance himself from his rivals in the 1999 election, Kato Koichi and Yamasaki Taku.  
Kato faction member Ikeda Yukihiko was selected as General Council, but he was known 
to maintain his distance from Kato.  The sole cabinet appointment from the Yamasaki 
faction was Fukaya Takashi, “who was reluctant to push Yamasaki as a candidate for the 
presidency” (Nikkei Weekly 10/11/99).  Obuchi also formed an alliance with the Eto-
Kamei faction and promoted little known upper-house lawmaker and faction member 





Factions have existed in the LDP since its formation via the merger of the Liberal 
Party and Democratic Party in 1955.  This survey of factional behavior reveals that 
factions during the 1990s behaved virtually identically to their earlier counterparts.  
Numerous individuals predicted the downfall of factions in the LDP after the party’s 
1993 split and Japan’s 1994 electoral reforms.  Even the LDP attempted to outlaw 
factions in 1994.  Despite these predictions and efforts, the majority of LDP members 
still belong to a faction.  Furthermore, factional membership remains the key factor in 
determining party and cabinet appointments.  
This leads to the ultimate question: Why do factions really exist?  Previous 
research has established postwar factions as institutionalized coalitions of politicians 
(Fukui 1970 & 1978, Richardson 1999).   I contend that this research remains pertinent to 
factions throughout the 1993-2000 time period.  In other words, factions continue to exist 
as self-perpetuating groups essential for the LDP to function.   
There are a variety of factors that contribute to factions’ institutionalization, but I 
have identified three that I believe to be the largest contributors.  First, factionalism is not 
a development unique to the LDP.  Factions have existed in Japan’s political parties since 
the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate.  Second, the LDP’s massive size creates a need for 
smaller groups within the party.  These groups provide an efficient means of 
communication and advancement.  Third, advancing in the LDP requires the use of an 
complex system of personal ties.  It is nearly impossible for younger members to advance 
without the assistance of the faction elites.  Conversely, faction elites need the support of 
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younger members to improve their standing within their faction and the LDP itself.  I will 
now discuss each of these reasons in greater detail to show the full extent of 
institutionalization in the LDP. 
 
Historical Precedent 
Factionalism can be found in the first Japanese political parties that developed 
after the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868.  Membership in these political parties 
was geographically based.  Individuals from the same region began working together to 
advance their interests.  However, it did not take long for these parties to look for ways to 
expand their range of influence.  Groups from Tohoku, Kanto, Kyushu, and Shikoku 
joined together to form the Constitutional Liberal Party (CLP).  Each of these former 
regional groups developed into a faction within the CLP. 
 Factionalism also developed within the CLP’s primary opposition.  The 
Constitutional Progressive Party (CPP) was filled with class-based factionalism after its 
founders’ departure.  Tokyo intellectuals founded the CPP, and a rift emerged between 
the party’s intellectual elites and its working class members.  Another layer of 
factionalism was added when the CLP and CPP combined into the Constitutional 
Government Party.  However, the disagreements between the CGP factions proved to be 
too great and the party split apart after failing to agree over a cabinet reshuffle in 1989. 
 Japan’s dominate political party after the CGP split was Seiyukai or the 
Constitutional Association of Political Friends.  These factions began to behave in a 
manner that parallels the LDP’s present-day factions.  Seiyukai’s factional memberships 
were initially based on geographic ties to places such as Kanto and Kyushu.  One or two 
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influential politicians led each regional faction and served as figureheads for the party.  
Much like present-day faction leaders, Seiyukai’s faction leaders assisted younger 
politicians with their political advancement in exchange for loyalty.  
 In 1922, Seiyukai’s factions began to shift away from their regional ties and focus 
on issues of coalitions and power.  During a cabinet reshuffle, a dominant coalition of 
factions led by Prime Minister Takahashi Korekiro faced-off with a dissident group lead 
by two prominent cabinet members.  The development of factional alliances and 
heightening of tensions indicates factionalism had become “the norm of constitutional 
government” (Fukui 1970: 17).  During these years Seiyukai also developed the present-
day LDP positions of Secretary-General, Executive Council Chairman, and PARC 
Chairman.  
Seiyukai also used factions as a means of distributing appointments and money.  
After the Russo-Japanese War, campaigns became more costly for politicians since the 
number of eligible voters increased. The price of running for office and the rising 
influence of the zaibatsu created an opportunity for factions to formalize their relations 
with the business sector.  Each faction developed an extensive relationship with a 
zaibatsu such as Nissan or Mitsubishi (Fukui 1970: 26-30). 
It seems unlikely Seiyukai’s factionalism could survive World War II and the 
subsequent occupation.  However, it is important to note that the postwar Liberal Party 
was essentially the successor to the Kuhara faction of Seiyukai.  Nearly 30 of the Liberal 
Party’s 46 original Diet members belonged to the Kuhara faction (Fukui 1970: 28).  The 
party recreated the top positions from Seiyukai, Secretary-General, Executive Council 
Chairman, and PARC Chairman.  These individuals were accustomed to using factions as 
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a means for advancement and monetary support.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
Liberal Party eventually split into factions centered on the party’s elites, Yoshida and 
Hatoyama.  These factions also resembled present day factions in that they were 
dominated by subgroups.  Yoshida’s faction reportedly had as many as seven groups 
competing for attention.  Despite a massive war and occupation, Seiyukai successfully 
transmitted its structure to the Liberal Party.  This structure was transmitted again when 
the Liberal Party merged with the Democratic Party to form the LDP in 1955. 
 
Size 
The LDP has over 350 members in the Diet and 2.1 million members nationwide 
(Hrebenar 2000:126).  An organization this large naturally has difficulty communicating.  
Factions provide a mechanism for communication by functioning as smaller parties 
within the larger party (Hrebenar 2000, Richardson 1999).  Each of these smaller parties 
is lead by an influential politician who has risen to the top of his faction.  It is likely that 
the larger, more powerful factions will secure the top positions in the party and 
government, but even the smaller Komoto faction has produced two Prime Ministers.  It 
is unlikely that these individuals would have reached the government’s top office if they 
were not the heads of a faction. 
By working as smaller parties within the LDP, factions give younger politicians 
opportunities for advancement.  If a politician continues to be elected, he will attract the 
attention of his faction’s elites and potentially become an elite himself.  His advancement 
may lead to recognition and appointments within the party or cabinet. Essentially, a Diet 
member’s success in his “smaller party” or faction will determine his success within the 
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LDP.  Without factions it would be more difficult for younger politicians obtain the 
recognition necessary to succeed in a party as massive as the LDP.  
 
Party Structure & Personal Ties 
 
 The LDP’s factional structure is based on a system of institutionalized personal 
ties.  Fukui has argued that factions parallel social anthropologist Chie Nakane’s theories 
on Japanese society (1970).  Nakane believes social groups in Japan can be characterized 
in vertical groups similar to the one Fukui discusses below: 
 
 
“The leader (a) is personally and directly related to senior members (b), (c), and 
(d), who in turn are similarly related to respectively to members (e) and (f), (g) 
and (h), and (i) and (j) and so on.  On the other hand, the relationships between (a) 
and (e), (f), (g), etc. are indirect; those between (a) and (k), (l), (m), etc. are even 
more indirect.  The lateral ties between (b), (c), and (d), or between (e), (f), (g), 
etc. are nonexistent or extremely weak.  Actually, such relationships cannon be 
truly lateral, since each member’s status in the hierarch is determined by the 
closeness of his relationship to his immediate boss and through him to the bigger 
bosses in the hierarchy, ultimate to the top leader.  As the figure above suggest, 
the psychological distances between (a) and (b) and between (a) and (c) are 
different; (b) is closer than (c) to their boss, while (c) is closer than (d).  This 
means that (b) is higher in status than (c), and (c) higher than (d), in terms of the 
intragroup ranking systems.  Likewise, (e) is higher than (f), (f) is higher than (g), 
etc. and (k) is higher than (l), (l) than (m), etc.  As Nakane points out, no two 
members can be of equal status in this type of group” (Fukui 1978). 
  
According to Fukui, this creates a structure where a person’s advancement 
depends on two factors: (1) His relationship with his boss. (2) His success in competing 
against other party members of his rank for his boss’s attention.  This system creates a 
sense of loyalty towards leaders and sub-leaders, but intense competition among party 
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members.  These two factors place emphasis on individual leaders, create divisive 
pressures within a faction, and disperse power amongst sub-leaders. 
The emphasis on individual leaders is a trait that can be observed throughout the 
postwar era.  Succession is nearly always problematic in a faction.  The conflict over 
Takeshita’s successor led to the LDP’s split in 1993.  It is also important to remember 
that in even if a sub-leader becomes a leader, there are other forces that may linger in the 
background.  In the 1970s and 1980s, Tanaka retained control of his faction after he was 
forced out of office.  Conversely, Watanabe had difficulty obtaining loyalty from his 
faction after succeeding Nakasone. 
This system of personal ties and competition creates a variety of decisive forces.  
Faction members remain loyal to their superiors, but they are constantly looking for ways 
to “appear” more loyal than their fellow faction members.  This creates conflict at each 
level of leadership, since each politician is interested in being the next in line to advance 
in the faction. 
These conflicts allow faction sub-leaders to become quite powerful.  Each sub-
leader commands a group of politicians eager to obtain more power within the party.  
These sub-leaders form coalitions within the faction to determine the faction’s leader.  On 
a larger scale, factions form coalitions to determine the LDP President and often the 
Prime Minister.  Therefore, if a faction head wants to become Prime Minister he must 
enlist the help of his and other factions.  Factions that form the dominant alliance that 
supports the winning candidate will be rewarded with attractive party and cabinet 
appointments.  For example, the post of Finance Minister is more attractive than Minister 
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of State for Gender Equality.  Faction leaders and elites use their subgroups to secure 
their position and advancement. 
This system of subgroups has perpetuated throughout the LDP’s postwar years.  
No individual has succeeded in advancing to a significant position within the party or 
government without the use of this system of personal ties.  Even former Prime Minister 
Tanaka, arguably the most influential figure in LDP history, required the support of a 
faction to ensure his power. 
 
Conclusion 
A combination of historical precedents, the LDP’s massive size, and a complex 
system of personal ties all contribute to the institutionalization of factions in the LDP.  It 
is important to emphasize this paper is an exploratory survey into the significance of 
LDP’s factions from 1993 until 2000.  The LDP’s size, presidential elections, and 
personal ties all contribute to the continued significance of factions, but more research is 
needed to determine the extent of each faction’s contribution.  However, neither the 
LDP’s 1993 split nor Japan’s 1994 electoral reforms have prevented factions from 
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